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a b s t r a c t 
Rabin’s psychological game-theoretic model of ‘fairness’ has been the starting point for a 
literature about preferences for reciprocity. In this literature, reciprocity is modelled by 
deﬁning an individual’s ‘kindness’ or ‘unkindness’ in terms of the consequences of his ac- 
tions for others, and assuming a motivation to reward (punish) other people’s kindness 
(unkindness). Contrary to intuition, this form of reciprocity cannot explain mutually bene- 
ﬁcial trust and trustworthiness in a simple Trust Game. We formalise and offer a diagnosis 
of this ‘Paradox of Trust’. We distinguish between two kinds of reciprocity. Rabin’s con- 
cept of reciprocal kindness is a psychologically plausible motivation, and the paradox is an 
informative result about the implications of this motivation. However, trust is better un- 
derstood in terms of reciprocal cooperation – the motivation to play one’s part in mutually 
beneﬁcial practices, conditional on others playing their parts. We show that a theory of 
reciprocal cooperation can avoid the paradox. 
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 Matthew Rabin’s model of preferences for ‘fairness’ ( Rabin, 1993 ) is one of the earliest applications of psychological game
theory. It has also been one of the most inﬂuential, providing the starting point for an important strand in the social prefer-
ence literature. Rabin’s model has two fundamental features which, in this literature, have come to be seen as characteristic
of reciprocity. The ﬁrst feature is a concept of kindness . In a two-player game, the degree to which one player i is kind or
unkind to the other player j is assessed by taking i ’s beliefs about j ’s strategy as given and then considering the decision
problem faced by i as if it were a non-strategic choice among the alternative distributions of material payoffs between the
players that are feasible for i . 1 Since this is the kind of problem that is faced by the active player in a Dictator Game, we
will call it a dictator problem . 2 Player i shows kindness (unkindness) towards j by choosing a distribution that is relatively An earlier version of this paper was presented at a workshop on behavioural game theory held at the University of East Anglia in 2017. We thank 
participants in this workshop, and particularly Martin Dufwenberg and Amrish Patel, for comments. Our work was supported by funding from the European 
Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, grant agreement No. 670103. 
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E-mail addresses: a.isoni@warwick.ac.uk (A. Isoni), r.sugden@uea.ac.uk (R. Sugden). 
1 Throughout the paper (except when discussing public goods in Section 4 ) we will consider only two-player games. In such games, whenever players 
are indexed by i and j , we assume i  = j and refer to i as ‘he’ and to j as ‘she’. 
2 We apply the term ‘Dictator Game’ to any game in which one player chooses between alternative distributions of material payoffs between himself 
and a co-player. We do not require that the sum of the two payoffs is constant. 
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 favourable (unfavourable) towards her. The second feature is that each player has a preference for rewarding the other player
for acting on kind intentions and punishing her for acting on unkind intentions. Because i ’s kindness is deﬁned in terms of
his beliefs about j ’s strategy, and because j ’s preferences for rewarding or punishing i ’s good or bad intentions are deﬁned in
terms of her beliefs about i ’s kindness or unkindness, players’ utilities depend on their ﬁrst- and second-order beliefs: hence
the need for psychological game theory. Models with these two properties will be called models of reciprocal kindness . 
The present paper is concerned with a surprising property of Rabin’s model, which we will call the Paradox of Trust .
This is that, in a simple Trust Game, there cannot be an equilibrium in which trust by one player and trustworthiness by
the other are mutually beneﬁcial. This result is surprising because Rabin’s model is generally understood as a model of
reciprocity, and because the relationship between trustworthiness and trust is naturally described as one of reciprocity. 3 
Rabin (1993 : 1296–1297) hints at this sense of surprise when, discussing a variant of the paradox, he acknowledges that his
model does not adequately represent the motivation to return trust. Our aim is to identify the source of this problem. 
We must make clear that the problem is not that there are observable regularities in other-regarding behaviour that a
model of reciprocity does not explain. Rabin (1993 : 1296–1297) makes clear that his model is not intended to represent all
the emotions that induce other-regarding behaviour: the intention is only to isolate one such emotion. 4 Nor is the problem
that behavioural economics lacks any explanation of observations of mutually beneﬁcial actions in Trust Games. For example,
such actions are consistent with the hypothesis, proposed by the theories of normative expectations ( Sugden, 1998 ), trust re-
sponsiveness ( Pelligra, 2005; Bacharach et al., 2007 ) and guilt aversion ( Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007 ), that individuals are
motivated to behave in ways that conﬁrm other people’s expectations of beneﬁt. But intending to conﬁrm another person’s
expectations of your kindness to him is not the same thing as intending to reciprocate his kindness to you. The problem
posed by the Paradox of Trust is to explain how mutually beneﬁcial trust and trustworthiness can arise from reciprocity . 
In Section 1 , we characterise the Paradox of Trust in terms of a description of the behaviour and beliefs of two players
in two related games. We argue that this description represents a psychologically credible scenario in which, in an intu-
itive sense, the players act on intentions for reciprocity. We show that this scenario is inconsistent with Rabin’s model.
In Section 2 , we show that close analogues of this paradox also occur in the models of reciprocal kindness proposed by
Charness and Rabin (2002) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) . We also consider the generalisation of Rabin’s original model
proposed by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) . Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger make an amendment to Rabin’s model
which eliminates the paradox. We argue that this amendment lacks a convincing psychological rationale and has impli-
cations that are not compatible with intuitive understandings of kindness and reciprocity. In Section 3 , we present our
diagnosis of the paradox. We argue that Rabin’s conception of reciprocal kindness is a psychologically plausible motivation,
and that the Paradox of Trust is an informative result about the collective consequences that follow when individuals are
motivated in this way. However, we distinguish between this conception of reciprocity and reciprocal cooperation – playing
one’s part in mutually beneﬁcial practices, conditional on others playing their parts. In Section 4 , we give a sketch of one of
the earliest behavioural models of reciprocal cooperation, that of Sugden (1984) . The idea that individuals can sometimes be
motivated by this form of reciprocity is psychologically plausible too, and can explain practices of mutually beneﬁcial trust
and trustworthiness. Section 5 concludes. 
1. Rabin’s model of reciprocity and the Paradox of Trust 
As an experimental paradigm, the Trust Game originates in the work of Berg et al. (1995) , but it has a much longer
history as a theoretical model. Hobbes (1651/ 1962 : 110–115) discusses an example in which a prisoner of war can be
released in return for a promise to pay a ransom on return to his home country. The captor performs ﬁrst, trusting the
captive to perform second. Hobbes argues that, because of the value of reputation, it is rational for the captive to pay the
ransom. A much more recent precursor of Berg et al.’s experiment is the core of Akerlof’s (1982) model of labour contracts
as ‘partial gift exchange’. In this model, an employer pays a worker more than the worker’s reservation wage; the worker
responds by supplying costly effort when effort cannot be monitored. 
Our discussion will focus on the speciﬁc Trust Game shown in Fig. 1 and denoted by G 1 . This game involves two players,
P1 (the ﬁrst mover) and P2 (the second mover). 
Payoffs are expressed in units of some material good that is valued by both players, measured relative to some reference
point. For compactness, we will write the Trust Game as G 1 = { 1 (0, 0), { 2 (–1, 3), (1, 1)}}. The inner pair of brackets { 2 …}
denote the decision problem faced by P2 if her decision node is reached; her choice is between alternative distributions of
material payoffs. The outer pair of brackets { 1 …} denote the decision problem faced by P1 at his decision node: he can
choose either to bring about the distribution (0, 0) or to allow P2 to choose from { …}. Our analysis of this game can be2 
3 Although ‘kindness’, ‘unkindness’, ‘reward’ and ‘punishment’ are terms used by Rabin himself, the word ‘reciprocity’ does not appear in Rabin’s original 
paper. However, its use to describe motivations to reward kindness and punish unkindness is now standard (e.g. Charness and Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg 
and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006 ). When reporting the results of the ﬁrst Trust Game experiment, Berg et al. (1995) describe their ﬁndings 
as evidence of ‘reciprocity’. 
4 Charness and Rabin (2002 : 851) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004 : 272) make similar remarks about their models of reciprocity, which we will 
discuss later. 
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Fig. 2. P2’s Dictator Game ( G 1 
′ ). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 generalised to any game of the form { 1 (0, 0), { 2 ( x 1 , x 2 ), ( y, y )}} where x 1 < 0 < y < x 2 . By setting the two players’ payoffs
equal to one another, both after hold and after ( send, return ), we screen out the effects of preferences for equality. 5 
We will also consider the game shown in Fig. 2 and denoted by G 1 
′ = { 2 (–1, 3), (1, 1)}, which we will call P2’s Dictator
Game . It is identical to the decision problem faced by P2 in the Trust Game, except that it is not preceded by any action by
P1. The person who is P1 (respectively P2) in one game is also P1 (respectively P2) in the other, and so acts on the same
preferences in both games. P2’s actions in her Dictator Game will be called unequal (corresponding with keep ) and equal
(corresponding with return ). Comparisons between these two games will allow us to analyse whether P2’s behaviour in the
Trust Game is contingent on P1’s choice of send . 
Behaviour strategies for P1and P2 in the Trust Game are fully described by the respective probabilities q 1 and q 2 with
which P1 chooses send and (conditional on P1 having made this choice) P2 chooses return . To allow a psychological game-
theoretic analysis, we also need to specify ﬁrst- and second-order beliefs. We will say that there is ﬁrst-order consistency of
beliefs if P1 (respectively P2) believes that P2’s (respectively P1’s) behaviour strategy is q 2 (respectively q 1 ). In other words,
players hold correct beliefs about each other’s strategy choices. There is second-order consistency of beliefs if P1 (P2) believes
that P2 (P1) believes that P1’s (P2’s) behaviour strategy is q 1 ( q 2 ). In other words, players hold correct beliefs about each
other’s ﬁrst-order beliefs. In P2’s Dictator Game, the only behaviour strategy to consider is that of P2. The probability with
which P2 chooses equal is denoted q 2 
′ ; ﬁrst- and second-order consistency of beliefs are deﬁned as before. 
Now consider the following scenario, which we will call Trust World . In this scenario, q 1 = q 2 = 1 in the Trust Game and
q 2 
′ < 1 in P2’s Dictator Game; in both games, there is ﬁrst- and second-order consistency of beliefs. This scenario describes
a world in which, if P1 and P2 play the Trust Game, P1 is fully trusting (he chooses send with probability 1) and P2 is fully
trustworthy (she chooses return with probability 1). Each player believes that the other is fully trusting or trustworthy, and
that the other believes that he or she is fully trustworthy or trusting. However, if P2’s Dictator Game is played, P2 chooses
equal with probability less than 1. Thus, P2’s choice of return in the Trust Game cannot be explained simply by assuming
that she has a history-independent preference for (1, 1) over (–1, 3), for example because of altruism or inequality aversion.
The explanation of that choice must involve the idea that P2 chooses return in response to P1’s choice of send . 6 Deliberately,
our description of Trust World provides no explanation of the players’ actions or beliefs. Our claim is that it provides an
idealised representation of a psychologically intelligible interaction between a trusting ﬁrst mover and a trustworthy second
mover. Intuitively, Trust World seems to describe the workings of some kind of reciprocity. A model of reciprocal kindness
falls prey to the Paradox of Trust if it cannot represent this description as an equilibrium. 
We begin with Rabin’s seminal model. Strictly interpreted, this model applies only to normal-form games, while the
Trust Game is sequential. Extending Rabin’s model to sequential games in general is not a trivial task, because of the need to5 This assumption is signiﬁcant only for our discussion of the model proposed by Falk and Fischbacher (2006) . 
6 There is experimental evidence that individuals are in fact more likely to choose return as second movers in Trust Games than to behave contrary to 
self-interest in corresponding Dictator Games ( McCabe et al., 2003 ). For the purposes of our argument, however, we need to claim only that a person might 
plausibly have a motivation to reciprocate trust that is independent of altruism or inequality aversion. 
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 track changes in ﬁrst- and second-order beliefs over the course of a sequential game. 7 However, Trust World has properties
that allow an uncontroversial translation of Rabin’s assumptions to behaviour in that world. Because the Trust Game has
only one decision node for each player, there is no need to consider how players’ beliefs might change with changes in
information. Because each of these nodes is reached with non-zero probability, we do not face the problem of having to
justify assumptions about what a player would believe, were a zero-probability event to occur. 8 And because the probability
of each action is either 0 or 1, it does not matter whether the kindness of a co-player’s previous actions is assessed in terms
of ex ante probabilities or ex post realisations. 9 
In Rabin’s model, players get utility from their material payoffs, from being kind to co-players who are kind to them, and
from being unkind to co-players who are unkind to them. They also get utility directly from the belief that a co-player is
being kind to them, and get disutility directly from the belief that a co-player is being unkind to them. In a two-player game,
the kindness of a player i is deﬁned by reference to the dictator problem he faces, given his beliefs about the behaviour and
beliefs of his co-player j . In the most general statement of the model, i ’s kindness is deﬁned relative to some unspeciﬁed
normative rule for ‘sharing along the Pareto frontier’ of his dictator problem; that rule picks out an equitable payoff for j
which lies strictly between the highest and the lowest payoffs for j on that frontier, unless there is only one such payoff on
the frontier, in which case that payoff is the equitable one (pp. 1286, 1297). In the speciﬁc form of the model that Rabin
favours, j ’s equitable payoff is the average of the two extremes. If i ’s chosen strategy implies an expected payoff for j that is
higher (lower) than the equitable benchmark, i is kind (unkind) to j . The extent of i ’s kindness or unkindness is measured
entirely in terms of the effect of his decision on j ’s payoff; no account is taken of how much i sacriﬁces in beneﬁting (or
harming) j . 10 
In Trust World, P2 chooses return . By doing this, she chooses (1, 1) from the set {(–1, 3), (1, 1)}. Clearly, that choice is
kind. Given his belief that P2 will choose return with probability 1, P1 chooses (1, 1) from the set {(0, 0), (1, 1)}. Since the
Pareto frontier for this dictator problem is the singleton {(1, 1)}, P1’s chosen action is neither kind nor unkind. Because of
this, Rabin’s model implies that P2 merely maximises her material payoff, and so chooses keep – contrary to the description
of Trust World. The implication is that Rabin’s model is not consistent with that scenario. In other words, the most famous
social-preference model of reciprocity is unable to explain what, intuitively, seems to be a paradigm case of reciprocity. This
illustrates the Paradox of Trust. 
Rabin’s paper includes a brief discussion of a normal-form version of the Trust Game (‘Leaving a Partnership’). Rabin
notes that the ‘cooperative’ strategy combination that corresponds with ( send, return ) is not an equilibrium in his model.
He says that, contrary to this implication of his model, ‘it seems plausible that cooperation would take place’. His response
to this variant of the Paradox of Trust is to say that his model is not intended to represent all psychological factors that
can affect behaviour in games; theorists may need to consider modelling ‘additional emotions’. The additional emotion he
has in mind is a desire ‘to reward trust’ (pp. 1296–1297). The idea seems to be that, in choosing return , P2 rewards P1 for
the goodness of send , and that send is worthy of reward because it is an act of trust. Rabin does not pursue the issue of
how trust should be deﬁned, or why it might be thought to deserve to be rewarded. Nevertheless, Rabin’s suggestion that
trust and reciprocal kindness result from different psychological mechanisms is signiﬁcant. If that suggestion is correct, the
Paradox of Trust may not be a limitation of his model: it may be an informative result about the psychology of reciprocal
kindness. 
As an illustration of how the paradox might be informative, consider Akerlof’s hypothesis about gift exchange in labour
markets. Akerlof’s model is effectively a Trust Game in which P1 is an employer and P2 is a worker; send is paying more
than the minimum necessary wage and return is performing more than the minimum necessary effort. The gift-exchange
equilibrium in this model is a version of Trust World. According to Akerlof, the relationship between employer and worker
is one of reciprocal kindness or ‘sentiment’, analogous with the relationship between people who exchange gifts at Christ-
mas (pp. 549–550). But imagine a worker who, after the employer has paid her more than the minimum wage, says: ‘My
employer has predicted that this wage will cause me to feel sentiment for the ﬁrm and so put in more effort. This isn’t
kindness; it is a sophisticated strategy for increasing proﬁt. But now he is expecting me to incur a sacriﬁce to beneﬁt him.
He has acted on self-interest, so why shouldn’t I do the same?’ This response encapsulates the logic of Rabin’s conception
of reciprocal kindness. If workers predictably reasoned in this way, an opportunity for mutual beneﬁt would be lost. That
might be unfortunate, but the attitude we have attributed to the worker does not seem psychologically implausible. The
implication, we suggest, is that the reciprocity expressed in practices of mutually beneﬁcial trust and trustworthiness must
be something other than reciprocal kindness. 7 Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) offer such a generalisation, but their model also includes a signiﬁcant amendment to Rabin’s assumptions. We 
will discuss this model in Section 2.3 . 
8 This is a deep problem in epistemic game theory: see, for example, Binmore (1987), Pettit and Sugden (1989) and Reny (1992) . 
9 In Rabin’s model of the normal form of the Trust Game, P2’s strategy choice depends on the perceived kindness or unkindness of P1’s chosen strategy, 
which in general is a probability mix of hold and send . In models of sequential reciprocity, P2’s choice at her decision node depends on the perceived 
kindness or unkindness of P1’s actual choice (either hold with probability 1 or send with probability 1). 
10 This feature might be seen as a limitation of Rabin’s original model, but it is orthogonal to our distinction between kindness and cooperation. It can 
be avoided by deﬁning i ’s kindness and unkindness in terms of implicit weights in i ’s utility function, as in Charness and Rabin’s (2002) model. 
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 2. Other models of reciprocal kindness 
We have argued that the Paradox of Trust is inherent to the psychology of reciprocal kindness. So far, however, our argu-
ment has been presented in relation to Rabin’s model of reciprocal kindness. In this section, we examine other psychological
game-theoretic models of reciprocal kindness to see whether they offer ways of avoiding the paradox. 11 
2.1. Charness and Rabin’s model of reciprocity 
Charness and Rabin (2002 : 851–858) propose a psychological game-theoretic model of social preferences that applies
to sequential games with material payoffs. In a two-player game, the utility of each player i is a weighted average of i ’s
material payoff and a measure of ‘social welfare’. In the baseline deﬁnition of this concept, social welfare is a weighted
average of the minimum and the sum of the two players’ payoffs. Negative reciprocity is modelled by deﬁning, for each
player i , an endogenous variable d i ≤0 which represents i ’s demerit . This is interpreted as a measure of ‘how much [that
player] deserves’; the more negative the value of d i , the less i deserves (p. 853). If i has zero demerit, j ’s utility function
uses the baseline measure of social welfare. The greater the absolute value of i ’s demerit, the less weight j ’s utility function
gives to i ’s payoffs. Like unkindness in Rabin’s original model, the demerit of player i is assessed by considering the dictator
problem faced by i , given i ’s beliefs about j ’s behaviour. Player i has demerit to the extent that his decision implies that
the weight he is giving to social welfare is less than some socially given ‘selﬂessness standard’. Thus, if i ’s action reveals
insuﬃcient selﬂessness, it will induce a negative response from j . There is no positive reciprocity in the model. 
This model is not compatible with Trust World. If P1 has zero demerit in the Trust Game, the decision problems faced
by P2 in the Trust Game and in her Dictator Game are equivalent to one another, and so the model cannot explain why P2’s
behaviour is different in the two games. But if P1’s demerit in the Trust Game is non-zero, 12 P2 will give less weight to P1’s
payoffs in that game than in her Dictator Game, and so P1 will be less likely to choose return in the former than to choose
equal in the latter. Again, this is inconsistent with the description of Trust World and leads to the Paradox of Trust. 
2.2. Falk and Fishbacher’s model of reciprocity 
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) propose a ‘theory of reciprocity’ which uses the framework of psychological game theory and
applies to sequential games with material payoffs. This model combines elements of inequality aversion, trust responsiveness
and reciprocal kindness. In a two-player game, the kindness of a player i at a given decision node is assessed in terms of ( j ’s
beliefs about) the payoff distribution implied by i ’s choice in the dictator problem he faces at that node, given his beliefs
about j ’s behaviour. He is ‘intentionally kind’ (intentionally unkind) if he chooses a distribution in which j has advantageous
(disadvantageous) inequality, and if he had an alternative option which would have given j a lower (higher) payoff. 13 The
assumed form of reciprocity can be roughly expressed as: ‘If your co-player is intentionally kind (unkind), try to reward
(punish) her by ensuring that she gets a better (worse) outcome than she expects’. This model is not compatible with
Trust World. In Trust World, P1’s choice is between the payoff distributions (0, 0) and (1, 1). In choosing (1, 1), P1 gives
P2 neither advantageous nor disadvantageous inequality, and so is neither kind nor unkind. Since Falk and Fischbacher’s
concept of reciprocity does not come into play, P2 acts on self-interest. But that implies that she chooses keep , contrary to
the description of Trust World. 
2.3. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger’s model of reciprocity 
Each of the models we have considered so far leads to some form of the Paradox of Trust. The model proposed by
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (hereafter DK; 2004) is an exception. DK retain the main features of Rabin’s original model
and extend it to sequential games. Because of the special features of Trust World described in Section 1 , we do not need to
discuss all the subtleties involved in moving from normal-form to sequential games. However, DK make a number of amend-
ments to Rabin’s model. We will focus on one of these amendments, which DK present as having the merit of eliminating
the Paradox of Trust (pp. 289–290). 14 11 We omit a detailed analysis of Levine’s (1998) attempt to represent reciprocal kindness without using psychological game theory. In Levine’s model, 
players have ‘types’, distinguished by their degrees of altruism or ‘spite’, and get utility from being kind (unkind) to co-players who are altruistic (spiteful). 
If players are initially uncertain about each other’s types, a kind action can signal altruism, and hence induce reciprocal kindness. In a Trust Game in which 
(as in Trust World) P2 believes with probability 1 that P1 will choose send, send has no information content, and so P2’s decision problem is equivalent to 
that of her Dictator Game. This is a variant of the Paradox of Trust. 
12 Intuitively, it seems unreasonable to treat P1’s choice of send as an indication of demerit. Formally, however, that choice can be rationalised by any 
utility function in which P1’s payoff and social welfare both have positive weight – including utility functions that fail to meet the selﬂessness standard. 
13 Falk and Fischbacher also allow the possibility that actions that lead to unequal outcomes are perceived as ‘kind’ or ‘unkind’ even if they were unin- 
tended. For our purposes, it is not necessary to consider this possibility. 
14 DK argue that this amendment has a further advantage. Because of the way Rabin deﬁnes the concept of ‘equitable payoff’, a straightforward extension 
of his model to sequential games would imply the non-existence of equilibrium in some games. By making each player’s equitable payoff independent of 
players’ beliefs, DK’s amendment avoids this problem ( Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004 , p. 289). 
Please cite this article as: A. Isoni, R. Sugden, Reciprocity and the Paradox of Trust in psychological game theory, Journal 
of Economic Behavior and Organization (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.015 
6 A. Isoni, R. Sugden / Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 0 0 0 (2018) 1–9 
ARTICLE IN PRESS 
JID: JEBO [m3Gsc; May 11, 2018;10:56 ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Consider a sequential game for two players. At any given decision node for a player i, i ’s kindness is deﬁned in rela-
tion to the set of payoff distributions that are feasible for i , given his updated beliefs about j ’s behaviour. So far, this is a
straightforward generalisation of the dictator problem that underlies the concept of kindness in Rabin’s model. Recall that
in Rabin’s model, i ’s kindness to j is measured relative to an ‘equitable payoff’ for j that is deﬁned as the average of the
highest and lowest payoffs for j on the Pareto frontier of this problem. DK use a different deﬁnition of ‘equitable payoff’. 
This deﬁnition rests on the more basic concept of an eﬃcient strategy. Whether any speciﬁc behaviour strategy is eﬃcient
is a property of that strategy in relation to the game as a whole; it is independent of players’ beliefs and is invariant with
respect to the history of play. In general, a behaviour strategy for a given player is ineﬃcient ‘if there exists another strategy
which conditional on any history of play and subsequent choices by the others provides no lower material payoff for any
player, and a higher material payoff for some player for some history of play and subsequent choices by the others’ (p. 276).
Roughly speaking, a strategy for a given player is ineﬃcient if some other strategy Pareto-dominates it in material payoffs
for all possible decisions by other players. At any given decision node for player i, j ’s equitable payoff is ‘the average between
the lowest and the highest material payoff of j that is compatible with i choosing an eﬃcient strategy’ (pp. 276–277). As in
Rabin’s model, i is kind (unkind) to j if, given his beliefs about j ’s strategy, his action induces a payoff for j that is greater
than (less than) j ’s equitable payoff. 
Notice a fundamental difference between Rabin’s and DK’s measurements of kindness. In both models, the dictator prob-
lem that is used to assess i ’s kindness is deﬁned in relation to i ’s beliefs about other players’ strategies. In Rabin’s model,
i ’s kindness to j is measured relative to an equitable payoff for j that is deﬁned solely in terms of the properties of i ’s dic-
tator problem, and thereby in relation to i ’s beliefs. In DK’s model, in contrast, the benchmark from which i ’s kindness is
measured is independent of i ’s beliefs. DK do not give any psychological intuition for this construction except for an implicit
appeal to the psychological plausibility of ( send, return ) as an equilibrium in the Trust Game. But for this to be satisfactory,
the amendment must have similarly plausible implications for other games. 
Before exploring this issue, we show that DK’s model is compatible with the properties of Trust World. To do this, we
assume that actions and beliefs are as speciﬁed by the description of Trust World, and check that there is no contradiction
with the assumptions of DK’s model. Notice that all strategies in the Trust Game are eﬃcient. In particular, hold is eﬃcient
because its outcome, (0, 0), is not Pareto-dominated by every possible outcome of send . If P1 were to choose s end , P2 would
have the option of choosing keep , leading to (–1, 3). In P1’s belief, the probability of keep , conditional on send , is zero; but
DK’s concept of eﬃciency is belief-independent. Given his actual beliefs, P1 faces the dictator problem {(0, 0), (1, 1)}. Since
both P1’s strategies are eﬃcient, the equitable payoff for P2 is 0.5, and so send is kind; it also maximises P1’s material
payoff. Thus, if (in P1’s belief) return is not unkind, P1’s choice of send is consistent with the model. Given that P1 has
chosen send , P2’s dictator problem is {(–1, 3), (1, 1)}, and the equitable payoff for P1 is 0. If P2 believes that send is kind,
and if she has a suﬃciently strong preference to reciprocate kindness, her choice of return is kind and utility-maximising.
Thus, the combination of send and return is consistent with the model. In P2’s Dictator Game, in contrast, reciprocity does
not come into play, and so DK’s model implies that P2 will choose unequal , consistently with the description of Trust World.
Given the underlying conceptual framework of social preference theory, DK’s classiﬁcation of send as kind might seem
psychologically plausible. It seems clear that P1’s choice of send has some property that might (but not necessarily will)
induce P2 to choose return , forgoing material payoff in a way that beneﬁts P1. If one thinks in terms of reward and punish-
ment, and if one thinks of kindness as the characteristic feature of actions that deserve reward, it is tempting to conclude
that send must be kind. For the moment, we set aside our reservations about these ‘if …’ clauses, and ask whether DK’s
kindness classiﬁcations are psychologically plausible in other cases. 
Consider game G 2 , deﬁned by G 2 = { 1 (0, 0), { 2 (0.5, –0.5), (1, 1)}}. For convenience, we label actions as in the Trust Game.
That is, the ﬁrst option in { 1 …} is hold and the second is send ; the probability of send is q 1 . Similarly, the ﬁrst option in
{ 2 …} is keep and the second is return ; the probability of return is q 2 . Consider the scenario in which q 1 = q 2 = 1, and in
which ﬁrst- and second-order beliefs are consistent in the sense deﬁned in Section 1 . This scenario differs from the Trust
World scenario for G 1 only with respect to the consequences of the zero-probability strategy combination ( send, keep ). In
G 2 , it is in P2’s interest to choose return , and so P1’s expectation of this action does not require a belief that P2 acts on an
other-regarding motivation. And whatever expectations P1 had held about P2’s action, it would still have been in his interest
to choose send . In this case, it seems natural to say that send is neither kind nor unkind, but merely prudent or rational.
Rabin’s model delivers this classiﬁcation. Just as in the Trust World scenario for G 1 , P1’s dictator problem is {(0, 0), (1, 1)};
the Pareto frontier for this problem is the singleton {(1, 1)}. According to Rabin’s deﬁnitions, send is therefore neither kind
nor unkind. Notice, however, that neither of P1’s strategies is ineﬃcient. Thus, according to DK’s deﬁnitions, the equitable
payoff for P2 is 0.5, just as in G 1 , and send is kind. 
Now consider game G 3 , deﬁned by G 3 = { 1 (0, 0), { 2 (0.5, 0.5), (1, 1)}}. Again, actions are labelled as in the Trust Game.
Consider the scenario in which q 1 = q 2 = 1, and in which ﬁrst- and second-order beliefs are consistent. The only difference
between the G 2 and G 3 scenarios is that G 3 gives P2 a higher payoff in the zero-probability event that send is followed by
keep . But now (0, 0) is not only below the Pareto frontier for P1’s dictator problem; it is also ineﬃcient in DK’s sense. Thus,
Rabin and DK agree in classifying send as neither kind nor unkind. Considered in isolation, this classiﬁcation makes intuitive
sense. But the comparative statics of DK’s model are puzzling. Why is send kind in G 2 but not in G 3 ? The only difference
between the scenarios concerns an opportunity that P1 gives to P2 by choosing send . In each case, this is an opportunity
that P2 has no reason to choose, and in fact does not choose. This opportunity has a higher material payoff for P2, and thePlease cite this article as: A. Isoni, R. Sugden, Reciprocity and the Paradox of Trust in psychological game theory, Journal 
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 same material payoff for P1, in the second case than in the ﬁrst. How can this difference make P1’s action less deserving of
reward in the second case? 
Thus, although DK’s amendment avoids the Paradox of Trust, it does not seem to offer a psychologically plausible account
of how reciprocal kindness can explain trust and trustworthiness. 
3. Reciprocal kindness versus reciprocal cooperation 
In models of reciprocal kindness, kindness (or its opposite, unkindness) is the most basic other-oriented motivation.
Recall that, in a two-player game, the kindness of a player i is understood as if he were responding to a dictator problem in
which he could choose from a ﬁxed set of alternative payoff distributions for himself and his co-player j . The composition
of this set depends on i ’s beliefs about j ’s behaviour and beliefs, but i ’s beliefs are taken as given. It follows that i ’s kindness
to j cannot affect i ’s beliefs about j ’s behaviour: j ’s role in the problem is entirely passive. Thus, although i ’s kindness
expresses an attitude towards outcomes for j , it cannot be intended as the ﬁrst move in a cooperative interaction with j : it
must be gratuitous , a free gift. Reciprocity enters these models only as a second-order preference for rewarding a co-player’s
kindness or for punishing her unkindness. Since kindness is gratuitous, rewarding it cannot be intended as the second move
in a cooperative interaction. In this sense, reward is gratuitous too. The contrast between gratuity and cooperation is the
source of the Paradox of Trust. 
It seems inescapable that in any credible model of reciprocal kindness in which there is consistency of ﬁrst- and second-
order beliefs, P2’s choice of return in the Trust Game must be classiﬁed as kind and her choice of keep as unkind. If such a
model is to be compatible with Trust World, P2’s choice of return must be a response to the kindness of send . The diﬃculty
is to explain how send can express kindness, given that P1 believes that P2 will choose return with probability 1. Since P1’s
dictator problem is {(0, 0), (1, 1)}, it seems that the only inference that can be drawn from his choice of send is that he is
not so gratuitously malevolent as to want to impose equal losses on himself and P2. 
Against this claim, it might be objected that the mere possibility that P2 might choose keep matters for an assessment of
the kindness of send , because P1 is exposing himself to the possibility of loss. This would be contrary to the basic principles
of both psychological and conventional game theory, in which what matter are players’ beliefs, because in Trust World, P1
assigns zero probability to that event. However, it might be said that, in assessing the kindness of P1’s action, we should
ignore any beneﬁts that he receives (however predictably) as a reward for its kindness. That thought ﬁts with the familiar
idea that a genuinely kind person does not consider how his kindness might be rewarded: virtue should be its own reward,
even if in fact it brings material rewards too. 15 This argument would perhaps have some force in Trust World if P2 believed
that P1 would have chosen send even if he had expected P2 to choose keep . That belief is not wholly implausible, since
(–1, 3) might be judged to generate more social welfare than (0, 0), and P1 might have a high degree of ‘selﬂessness’. If
that were the case for P1, his hypothetically selﬂess decision might be deemed to be gratuitously kind. By the same token,
however, it would not be an act of trust in the normal sense of the word, since P1 would not be relying on P2 to perform
any particular action. It would certainly be true to say that P2’s being free to choose keep is an essential part of what makes
send an act of trust, and not just a response to a dictator problem. But if trust and trustworthiness are to be understood
as reciprocal, P1’s choice of send must be in response to his belief that (with suﬃciently high probability) P2 will in fact
choose return . 
As this example illustrates, trust is not a form of kindness. Kindness is gratuitous, but trust is construed by the ﬁrst
mover as the beginning of an interaction with a trustee. The intuition that the Trust Game really is a model of trust and
trustworthiness seems to depend on the thought that, if P1 chooses send , he thinks of himself as playing his part in a joint
action, the other part of which is P2’s choice of return . Similarly, if P2 chooses return in response to P1’s choice of send , she
does not think of herself as gratuitously rewarding P1 for his gratuitous kindness to her: she is playing her part in the joint
action that P1 has initiated. The relationship between P1’s trust and P2’s trustworthiness is a kind of reciprocity, but it is
not reciprocal kindness. It is reciprocal cooperation , the reciprocity of playing one’s part in a cooperative practice when one
believes that the other party to that joint action will play (or has played) hers. 
The Paradox of Trust is that expecting to beneﬁt from one’s own act of kindness can undermine the kindness of the
act. Reciprocal cooperation does not run into a similar paradox: expecting to beneﬁt from an act of cooperation does not
undermine the cooperativeness of the act. To the contrary: the whole point of cooperation is that both parties beneﬁt.
Interestingly, when Berg et al. (1995 , p. 124) describe their Trust Game experiment as a study of ‘reciprocity’, they seem to
be thinking of reciprocal cooperation rather than reciprocal kindness: ‘If the [second mover] interprets the [ﬁrst mover’s]
decision to send money as an attempt to improve the outcome for both parties, then the [second mover] is more likely to
reciprocate’. 
Think of the worker in Akerlof’s model. She knows that the employer is not being gratuitously kind: he expects to beneﬁt
by paying a relatively high wage. Nor does the employer perceive himself to be incurring any risk in doing so: he believes
the probability of beneﬁting to be 1. His intention is to initiate a relationship with the worker that he expects to be mutually15 A related idea is developed by Roel (2017) in a recent paper about trust and reciprocity. Roel proposes an alternative to DK’s deﬁnition of an ‘eﬃcient’ 
strategy. The essential idea is that a strategy for player i is trust-eﬃcient if it is Pareto-eﬃcient, given the strategy that (in i ’s belief) j would have played, 
had she not been ‘generous’. In the Trust Game, a non-generous P2 would choose keep , and so hold is trust-eﬃcient and send is kind. 
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 beneﬁcial. If the worker supplies the effort that the employer expects, she is not rewarding him for that intention. It would
be truer to say that she is joining in with or completing that intention. 
4. A model of reciprocal cooperation 
In previous sections, we have argued that the behaviour exhibited by the Paradox of Trust should be understood as
reciprocal cooperation rather than as reciprocal kindness. We now offer a sketch of how a theory of reciprocal cooperation
might explain that behaviour. To be more precise, we show how such a theory might explain a Trust Game scenario in
which q 1 = q 2 = 1 without having implications about behaviour in any Dictator Game. Our approach is to adapt one of the
ﬁrst behavioural models of reciprocal cooperation, that of Sugden (1984) . 16 
Sugden’s model is concerned with voluntary contributions to public goods. In this model, there is a set N of players. Each
player i simultaneously chooses a non-negative contribution towards the provision of a public good from which all players
beneﬁt, not necessarily to the same extent. Consider any given proﬁle of contributions by players other than i , and any set
of players S ⊆ N that contains i . Player i ’s Kantian obligation to S is the solution to the following problem: Given the actual
contribution of each player (if any) who is not a member of S , and subject to the hypothetical constraint that each member
of S must make the same contribution as every other member, what level of contribution would maximise i ’s utility? If
S contains at least one player in addition to i, i ’s reciprocal obligation to S is whichever is the smaller of (1) his Kantian
obligation to S and (2) the smallest contribution made by any member of S other than i himself. If S = { i }, i ’s reciprocal
obligation to S is deﬁned to be the same as his Kantian obligation to that set or, equivalently, i ’s utility-maximising response
to the actual behaviour of his co-players. An equilibrium of the model is a proﬁle of contributions such that each player’s
contribution takes the smallest value that is consistent with his reciprocal obligation to every set S of which he is a member.
The intuitive idea is that each individual maximises utility subject to a self-imposed moral constraint that requires him to
match other people’s contributions to mutually beneﬁcial arrangements to supply the public good. 
Now consider how this model might be adapted to apply to a simple two-person sequential Public Good game. Suppose
that P1 and P2 are the potential beneﬁciaries of a public good. P1 moves ﬁrst, choosing whether to contribute two units
of material payoff to a public account ( contribute ) or not to contribute ( decline ). If P1 chooses decline , the game ends. If he
chooses contribute , P2 faces the same choice as P1 did. Each player earns 0.75 units for every unit contributed to the public
account by either player. In our notation, this corresponds to the Trust Game G 4 = { 1 (0, 0), { 2 (–0.5, 1.5), (1, 1)}}. 
In terms of Sugden’s model, each player’s Kantian obligation to {P1, P2} is the action contribute . If P1 chooses contribute ,
he has met this obligation, and so P2 has a reciprocal obligation to choose contribute too. If P1 expects that his choice of
contribute will be reciprocated by P2, that choice maximises his utility and ensures that he meets his reciprocal obligation
to {P1, P2}. Thus, ( contribute, contribute ) is an equilibrium in the sense of the model. The model is therefore compatible with
the Trust World scenario of the Trust Game. Notice that in this equilibrium, neither player is gratuitously kind, and neither
acts with the intention of rewarding the other for his or her good behaviour. P2’s action is contrary to her self-interest,
given the action that P1 has already taken, but she performs it as her part of a combination of actions that beneﬁts them
both. 
5. Conclusion 
The Paradox of Trust has sometimes been viewed as revealing a limitation of Rabin’s model of reciprocity that can be re-
paired by some minor amendment, such as Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger’s change to Rabin’s deﬁnition of ‘equitable payoff’.
We have argued against this interpretation. Rabin’s model is based on a conceptually and psychologically coherent notion
of reciprocal kindness. If this model is interpreted as a formalisation of this motivation, considered in isolation, the Paradox
of Trust is not a deﬁciency. To the contrary, it can be seen as one of the signiﬁcant results of psychological game theory.
It shows that if individuals’ other-regarding motivations are solely those of reciprocal kindness, there can be situations in
which mutually beneﬁcial trust and trustworthiness are not sustainable. 
One way of reading this result is as a potential explanation of situations in which opportunities for mutual beneﬁt are
not realised. For example, as we suggested in Section 1 , it identiﬁes a psychological mechanism that might frustrate an
employer’s attempt to induce unobservable effort by paying a worker more than her reservation wage. But it can also be
read as a demonstration that reciprocal kindness is not the only form that reciprocity can take. 
As we noted in Section 1 , the latter interpretation of the Paradox of Trust can be found in Rabin’s original paper. Rabin
left open the question of how cooperation should be explained, but suggested that trustworthiness might be modelled as
a desire to reward the intentions that lie behind acts of trust – an approach that would be in the spirit of psychological
game theory. We have argued that the motivation to be trustworthy should not be understood in terms of rewarding an-
other person’s meritorious action. Instead, acts of trust and trustworthiness should be seen as complementary components
of cooperative practices in which each participant is motivated to play his or her part, conditional on other parties playing
theirs. If behavioural economics is to explain mutually beneﬁcial trust and trustworthiness, it needs a theory of reciprocal16 As the focus of our paper is on psychological game theory, we do not try to review the various ways in which reciprocal cooperation and related 
concepts have been modelled. These include the models of ‘team reasoning’ proposed by Sugden (1993, 2015 ), Bacharach (1999, 2006 ) and Karpus and 
Radzvillas (2017) , and the model of ‘virtual bargaining’ proposed by Misyak and Chater (2014) . 
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 cooperation that is not ultimately grounded in concepts of gratuitous kindness and unkindness and of reward and punish-
ment. 
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